Information alliances in contests with budget limits by Konrad, Kai A.
www.ssoar.info
Information alliances in contests with budget limits
Konrad, Kai A.
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
SSG Sozialwissenschaften, USB Köln
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Konrad, K. A. (2010). Information alliances in contests with budget limits. (Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum
Berlin für Sozialforschung, Schwerpunkt Märkte und Politik, Forschungsprofessur und Projekt The Future of Fiscal
Federalism, 2010-21). Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH. https://nbn-resolving.org/
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-258012
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
 
 
 
 
 WISSENSCHAFTSZENTRUM BERLIN 
 FÜR SOZIALFORSCHUNG 
 
 SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 
 CENTER BERLIN 
 
  
 
 
Research Area 
Markets and Politics 
Research Professorship & Project 
"The Future of Fiscal Federalism" 
Schwerpunkt 
Märkte und Politik 
Forschungsprofessur & Projekt 
"The Future of Fiscal Federalism" 
 
Kai A. Konrad 
 
Information Alliances in Contests with Budget Limits 
 
 
  
 
Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property,  
Competition and Tax Law and WZB 
 
 SP II 2010 – 21 
December 2010  
 
 ii 
  
 
Kai A. Konrad, Information Alliances in Contests with Budget 
Limits, Discussion Paper SP II 2010 – 21, Wissenschaftszentrum 
Berlin, 2010. 
 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH, 
Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin, Germany, Tel. (030) 2 54 91 – 0 
Internet:  www.wzb.eu  
 iii 
ABSTRACT 
Information Alliances in Contests with Budget Limits    
by Kai A. Konrad * 
We study the role of information exchange through alliances in a framework 
with contestants who have binding budget limits and know their own budget limit 
but are incompletely informed about other contestants’ budget limits. First, we 
solve for the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then we consider the role of 
information exchange through alliances. Contestants learn the budget limits of 
all players who are within the same alliance, and then decide independently 
about their own contest efforts. This type of alliance formation is beneficial for 
alliance members and neutral for players who do not belong to the alliance. 
Also, a merger between alliances is beneficial for their members. Further, we 
consider merger between alliances and discuss the set of stable combinations 
of alliances. 
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1 Introduction
Participants in contests are often constrained by their budgets. Their willingness to
expend e¤ort may often exceed what they are actually able to spend. If several players
participate in a contest, the information about own and co-playersbudget constraints
is important, and the equilibrium outcome of the competition depends on the actual
budgets and on the distribution of information about these budgets. In this paper we
consider contests in which players are severely budget constrained, and in which the
actual budget of each single player is private information. We study the role of groups
of players who truthfully exchange information about their respective budgets. These
groups are called "information alliances". Our main research questions are: How does
the truthful mutual exchange of information about each others budget limits within
these groups a¤ect equilibrium behavior and playersequilibrium payo¤s? How does
the formation of an alliance a¤ect the payo¤s of members of the alliance and how
does it a¤ect outsiders? What does this imply for the willingness to take part in the
formation of an alliance? The formation of an alliance typically involves some type of
closer cooperation, possibly including joint actions, exchange of personnel, use of the
same information infrastructure etc. For this reason we believe that alliances cause
an information transfer between the members of the same alliance. The information
transfer may be a by-product, as the formation of an alliance may also have a large
number of other strategic aspects. Here we focus on the information exchange aspect
and restrict the role of an alliance to this aspect, allowing the alliance members to
compete and ght independently.
These questions are relevant in two areas of political competition. Perhaps the
most important example is military conict. Nation states engaged in war often use
their whole military capacity, rather than considering which stock of their weapons
they preserve for other purposes or future wars, suggesting that they are actually
budget constrained. And a nations actual military capacity is typically not per-
fectly known to adversaries.1 Alliances may change the distribution of information.
Weitsman (1997) argues that alliances are instruments for managing possible conict
1Stanley Kubricks movie Dr. Strangelove illustrates the role of information. In the movie the US
launches a nuclear attack against the Soviet Union, not knowing that the Soviet Union has installed
the "doomsday machine" that is automatically triggered by the attack and causes an armageddon.
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among the alliance members. Our analysis shows how information exchange inside
the alliance can eliminate military conict between alliance members. Bearce, Flana-
gan and Floros (2006) also relate the formation of alliances with information exchange
more directly. They argue that alliances, by including joint defence planning, joint ex-
ercises as rehearsals and joint operations, allow for an exchange of information about
various dimensions of military strength (numerical size, training, readiness, equip-
ment etc.). They illustrate this point by case studies of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and other prominent military alliances. Without o¤ering a
more formal analysis, they highlight a possible causal link between this information
exchange and the absence of military conict between alliance members. Their argu-
ment rests on the established bargaining theory of military conict, where incomplete
information is identied as a key reason for failure of reaching an e¢ cient (peaceful)
outcome (see, e.g., Fearon 1995). We borrow from their piecemeal evidence about the
role of alliances as institutions that facilitate information transfer among its members,
but pursue a di¤erent causal link between information and the outbreak of military
conict that is more closely related to the standard economic theory of contests. In
the formal analysis we rule out a bargaining stage, as successful bargaining requires
the ability to commit on the bargained outcome. Our formal analysis reveals that
information transmission in alliances reduces military conict. Another prediction of
our results is also in line with casual empirical observations: the process of alliance
formation and the exchange of information this may imply has a tendency to end up
with the smallest possible set of alliances.
Another example from the area of political science is electoral competition.
The role of campaign spending, campaign contributions and the regulatory frame-
work for electoral competition has been a focus of much research in political science.2
Candidatescampaign budgets, or a candidates capacity for mobilizing further cam-
paign resources may often be private information. These limits can be smaller than
the amount candidates may want to expend, given what they can gain in the elec-
toral contest. In this environment it may be benecial to learn about competitors
2A recent controversy on the competition e¤ects of regulation in this area is by Stratmann and
Aparicio-Castillo (2006), Lott (2006) and Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo (2007). A recent survey
is by Ashworth (2006). A formal analysis on the role of budget limits in a framework with complete
information is by Che and Gale (1997).
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budgets, or to let them know about ones own budget. The framework studied here
applies and the question of information alliances becomes relevant if more than two
candidates enter into the competition.
Suppose playersbudgets actually limit their maximum (non-refundable) ef-
forts in the equilibrium. After characterizing a su¢ cient condition for this constraint
to be binding, we consider alliances and alliance formation in this framework. We
study alliances that are dened as institutions that make the members of the alliance
truthfully exchange information about the budget limits of all its members. Each
player remains an independent player and chooses an independent e¤ort. Also, the
prize is awarded to one of the players as a function of these individual e¤orts. How-
ever, players inside the alliance exchange information. This exchange may inuence
the strategic situation for players inside and outside this alliance. We nd that an
alliance of this type generally benets the members of the alliance, whereas it has
no payo¤ implications for non-members of the respective alliance. We allow for a
partition of the set of players into multiple alliances, and we consider merger between
alliances from a given partition. We nd that, much like the formation of the alliance
itself, the merger between alliances benets the members of these alliances and has no
payo¤ implications for non-members of the respective merging alliances. This result
can be used for a characterization of the set of all stable alliance structures. We con-
clude from this analysis that information exchange about playersbudget constraints
or ghting power is a strong incentive for forming an alliance. In the absence of coun-
tervailing e¤ects of the alliance, we nd that the equilibrium structure of alliances
has the smallest possible number of alliances.
This analysis is related to several areas of research. A considerable amount of
research has been conducted on the contest without noise ("all-pay auctions"). All-
pay auctions with complete information have been solved by Hillman and Riley (1989),
Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1996) and Siegel (2009). Che and Gale (1997), Kvasov
(2007), Roberson (2006) and Ujhelyi (2009) studied di¤erent types of budget limits in
this framework, sustaining the assumption of complete information. A considerable
amount of work on incomplete information in all-pay auctions exists that assumes
that the incomplete information pertains to the valuation of the object or prize that
is at stake, or, similarly, to playersindividual unit cost of contest e¤ort.3 We focus
3Seminal papers in this context are Glazer and Hassin (1988), Amann and Leininger (1996),
4
on incomplete information that pertains to the playersabsolute e¤ort limits of what
they possibly can expend - a problem that has received comparatively little attention.4
While we also touch upon the case in which some players expend less than their budget
and others may exhaust their budget, the focus of the analysis is on the case in which
all players may expend their whole budget but have a positive payo¤ in expectation.
A key aspect of the analysis is the endogeneity of information at the stage of contest,
due to the possible formation of alliances.5
This analysis is also a contribution to what is called the alliance formation
puzzle. The formation of alliances is frequently observed (for instance, in the context
of military conict), whereas the theory of alliances in contests convincingly identies
several reasons why it can be expected that the formation of alliances is not benecial
for the parties who form the alliance, and benets players who do not become mem-
bers of an alliance. Esteban and Sákovics (2003) established this result in a contest
with three players. They compare a contest in which the players individually choose
their e¤orts, with a contest in which two players rst team up in an alliance, making
contributions that sum up to the alliances e¤ort. Should the alliance win the prize
against the single player, the two players ght internally about who of them receives
the prize. Their analysis shows that free-riding problems in the making of contribu-
tions to the e¤ort which the alliance as a group makes, and the anticipation of e¤ort
Krishna and Morgan (1997), Clark and Riis (2000), and Moldovanu and Sela (2001, 2006), and
Singh and Wittman (2001). For a recent contribution see Kovenock, Morath and Münster (2009).
Within these frameworks incomplete information about competitorsvaluation of the prize leads to
playersbids as functions of the playersvaluations which in turn leads to total bid e¤orts that fall
short of the valuation of the prize.
4The rst, and virtually only, paper addressing incomplete information about playersbudget
constraints in the all-pay auction is Che and Gale (1996), who compare equilibrium payo¤s of
the all-pay auction with the standard rst-price winner-pay auction. Budget limits have attracted
considerable attention, however, in other areas of economics. One example is the literature on
standard winner-pay auctions. See, for instance, Benoit and Krishna (2001), Brusco and Lopomo
(2008, 2009), Pitchik (2009) and Burguet and McAfee (2009).
5An endogenous choice of membership in one of several subgroups is considered in Konrad and
Konvenock (2009a). They analyse a complete information framework in which players self-select
into subgroups, and the members of the same subgroup compete for a limited number of identical
prizes. They focus on the coordination problem when players choose the subgroup they join and
consider how this coordination problem depends on the number of players, subgroups and prizes.
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costs in a future internal contest for the prize make such an alliance unattractive. The
formation of alliances in situations of conict is therefore often considered a puzzle or
paradox.6 Budget constraints and the desire to overcome them by pooling e¤orts is
one of the aspects that can make alliance formation desirable.7 Our analysis focuses
on a di¤erent aspect of alliance formation and reveals information exchange to be a
potentially important information incentive for alliance formation.8
The formal framework and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium are described in
section 2. This section also discusses why the analysis is limited to the case in
which the budget limitations are severe. Information alliances are analyzed in section
3. Merger and stability of a set of alliances are discussed in section 4. Section 5
summarizes the results and concludes.
2 Absence of alliance
Consider n players i 2 N = f1; :::; ng who compete in an all-pay contest in which the
winner is awarded a prize and all other players receive no prize. Let all players value
the winner prize equally at v = 1, and let these valuations be common knowledge.9
Nature assigns a budget mi to each player. The budgets mi are independent random
draws from the same probability distribution F (m) with the support [0; b] with b > 0
and an expected value of Em  R b
0
mdF (m). This probability distribution is common
6For a survey about alliances and alliance formation in contests, see Bloch (2009). There are
only some partial results explaining why alliances may actually benet the members of the alliance.
These include Skaperdas (1998) and Tan and Wang (1997) who suggest cost synergies in alliance
memberse¤orts, and additional strategic options as in Kovenock and Roberson (2008).
7See, e.g., Cho, Jewell and Vohra (2002) and Konrad and Kovenock (2009b). Whether or not
alliances allow for pooling of alliance memberse¤orts depends on the institutional framework.
8Some types of information spillovers between bidders have been considered in standard auctions.
In the context of standard (winner pay) rst price auctions with incomplete information about
biddersprocurement cost, Waehrer and Perry (2003) consider the role of merger between rms.
The merger essentially eliminates the less e¢ cient bidder and this relaxes competition. Kim and
Che (2004) also consider standard (winner pay) auctions if some bidders are informed about some
of their rivalsvaluations of the object that is auctioned.
9We could allow for some asymmetry in the valuations of the winner prize. For a range of
valuations for which expending an e¤ort that is equal to the whole own budget remains optimal,
this does not change the nature of the benet of information exchange.
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knowledge. In addition, all players i learn their own budget limit mi, but not the
budgets of the other players. Given the incomplete information all players i choose
their own contest e¤ort which is denoted as xi. E¤orts are non-negative and cannot
exceed the size of the respective players budget. These e¤orts must be made in full
and are non-refundable, irrespective of whether the player wins or does not win the
prize. The winner prize is awarded to the player who chooses the highest e¤ort. If
several players choose the same highest e¤ort, then the prize is randomly assigned to
one of them with equal probability. Player is payo¤ is equal to10
i(x1; :::; xn) =
(
1  xi if i wins the prize
 xi otherwise.
(1)
We search for the equilibrium function of e¤orts xi(mi) that describes the players
choices xi as a function of their own budget mi. If the playersbudgets are su¢ ciently
high, the budget constraint is non-binding and the problem is turned into a fully
symmetric standard all-pay auction with complete information (which is well studied).
Instead, we focus on cases in which the budget is small compared to the size of the
prize; and, in which, in the equilibrium, the budget constraint is binding for all players.
The probability distribution F (m) from which the budget constraints are chosen is
assumed to be continuous on the interval (0; b] and di¤erentiable on (0; b). These
assumptions rule out mass points for positive values of m, but they are consistent
with a possible mass point at m = 0. The probability density on the interior of the
support is denoted by F 0(m).
The existence of a mass point at zero is important for the type of equilibrium
in which the budget constraints are payo¤ relevant for n > 2. Therefore it is impor-
tant to note that this mass point has natural interpretations in many of the examples.
Players may be unable to choose positive e¤ort, with some probability. A commu-
nication breakdown or other exogenous shocks may prevent a country from military
10This contest success function has received considerable support as an analytical tool by an
analysis by Alcalde and Dahm (2010). They show that all-pay auctions with su¢ ciently little
noise have equilibria that are payo¤ equivalent to the equilibrium of the all-pay auction without
noise. These encompass rent-seeking games with a high exponent in Tullocks (1980) generalized
lottery contest, which have been analysed by Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1994, 1999). Note also
that similar information exchange benets that make information alliances attractive in our formal
context would emerge for many other contest success functions, provided that playersbudgets are
su¢ ciently tight to make players expend their whole budgets.
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mobilization in time, or the decision to mobilize may be blocked by political opposi-
tion. In political contests some candidates may drop out of a given competition, due
to a scandal, due to personal problems or for other reasons.
Given these assumptions, the following can be shown:
Proposition 1 Let (n 1)(F (m))n 2F 0(m)  1 for all m 2 (0; b). A Bayesian Nash
equilibrium exists with xi = mi. The expected ex-ante payo¤ of each player in this
equilibrium is (1=n)  Em.
Proof. Without loss of generality, consider player 1. Assume that all other players
follow the equilibrium strategy. The expected payo¤ of player 1 as a function of x1 is
1(0) =
1
n
(F (0))n 1  0 for x1 = 0, and 1(x1) = (F (x1))n 1   x1 for x1 > 0. Hence
limx1&0 1(x1) = (F (0))
n 1  1(0)  0, and
@1(x1)
@x1
= (n  1)(F (x1))n 2F 0(x1)  1  0 (2)
for all x1 > 0 if (n  1)(F (x1))n 2F 0(x1)  1. This shows that a corner solution xi =
mi maximizes is payo¤ and leads to a non-negative payo¤ for all possible values of
mi 2 [0; b]. The expected payo¤ (1=n) Em follows from the fact that all players are
ex-ante symmetric and all players expend their whole budget in the equilibrium.
Proposition 1 provides a condition for which players always nd it optimal to
expend their entire budget; and for which, in the equilibrium, all players are bud-
get constrained. The condition is (n   1)(F (m))n 2F 0(m)  1 and this condition is
fullled, for instance, for cumulative distributions which have a mass point of size
F (0) = e 
ln(n 1)
n 2 for n > 0 and a uniform distribution of the remaining probability
mass on a su¢ ciently small interval (0; b]. Note that this equilibrium permits out-
comes in which the players nd out ex-post that they collectively expended more than
the value of the prize. The condition (2) does not rule out that budgets mi in an
interval close to the value of the prize have a positive probability mass. Accordingly,
equilibrium outcomes may be observed in which all n players have drawn a budget in
the range [1  2"; 1  "] with " positive, but close to zero, leading to e¤orts that sum
up to more than n times 1  2".
The role of budget limits as binding constraints is particularly pronounced in
the type of equilibrium in Proposition 1, that is, if the condition (2) holds. This is why
we focus on the type of equilibrium in Proposition 1 when analyzing the formation
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of information alliances in later sections. If, instead, the distribution of budget limits
has su¢ cient weight on high budget values such that (2) does not hold, this removes
much of the novel aspect of this analysis and leads to equilibrium outcomes that have
been studied by Che and Gale (1996). For distributions F (m) which give higher
weights to higher budget limits, or with further mass points for positive amounts
of e¤ort, it is much less straightforward to determine closed form solutions for the
equilibrium.
Before turning to the role of alliance formation, consider briey the nature
of the equilibria if the budget constraints are less tight. For this purpose, let F (m)
be a distribution with support [0; b] without holes and without mass points. Let
(n 1)(F (m))n 2F 0(m) < 1 for allm 2 (0; b). It turns out that e¤orts xi = minfmi; 1g
do not constitute an equilibrium. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists in which the
e¤ort choices of players are (ex-ante) distributed according to G(x) with support
[0; 1] and
G(x) = n 1
p
x for x 2 [0; 1]: (3)
These two properties are proved in the Appendix. The equilibrium that is character-
ized by (3) is similar to the ones considered by Che and Gale (1996). In the equilibrium
outcome the fact that some players may own a budget that falls short of the value
of the object they are bidding for can be inconsequential for the payo¤s. Intuitively,
the reason why other bidders may expend small amounts of e¤ort does not matter
to a player. The low e¤ort may occur because players cannot choose a higher e¤ort
or because their randomization across the set of their feasible e¤ort levels given their
actual budget constraints makes them choose a low e¤ort. However, a requirement
for this equilibrium is that there is a su¢ ciently high probability that the bidders are
able to make a bid to generate a bid distribution (3). The result also shows that the
positive expected payo¤drops to zero if the budget limits are su¢ ciently relaxed for a
su¢ ciently large share of the players. Even though a player may know that the other
contestants are likely to be constrained and unable to choose e¤ort with a cost up to
the value of the prize, a player with a large budget cannot benet from this, as the
player does not know whether the other contestants are actually more constrained or
not.11
11The condition (2) and the condition for which equilibria of type (3) emerge leave considerable
ground uncovered. A case in which the two conditions are "tight" is for n = 2 if F (m) is a uniform
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We focus on equilibria in which the budget constraint is generally binding. It
has been explained in the introduction why this may be a highly relevant case for many
all-pay contests in which the prize that is at stake is a discounted present value of
future incomes or benets, whereas the e¤ort must be mobilized from what is currently
available (with military conict or international war as prototypical examples).
3 Information alliances
We now turn to alliances. An alliance is dened here as an information-sharing device:
members of the same alliance know the actual budget constraints of all other members
of their alliance before each player chooses his e¤ort. There may be several alliances.
But at this stage the grand alliance that encompasses all players is ruled out and
discussed later.
More formally, suppose there is a partition of the set N of all n players into
r  2 non-empty subgroups A1; :::Ar with numbers of members n1; :::; nr. These
groups are called alliance 1, alliance 2 etc. Suppose that all the members of each of
these subgroups share their private information about their own budget limits with the
other members of their alliance. The partition A  fA1; :::; Arg and the information
exchange inside alliances is also common knowledge. In order to compare the outcome
for di¤erent players and di¤erent partitions with the results in section 2, we dene
players who are in a subgroup which consists of just this player as stand-alone players.
Further, the information asymmetry between players from di¤erent alliances remains
as in section 2: for players from di¤erent alliances only the distribution F (m) is
common knowledge. Note that in this framework an alliance is not a vehicle to add
or compound the e¤orts of several players to a groups mega-e¤ort that may then
beat the rivals or rival groups.12 Further, while the formation of an alliance may
generate an additional surplus to its members, or may generate a cost, the formation
distribution on [0; b].
12We also disregard a possible wasteful conict about the distribution of the prize among alliance
members here. As has been highlighted by Esteban and Sákovics (2003) and Garnkel (2004), the
possibility of wasteful internal ghts about the distribution of a prize inside the alliance can be a
major drawback to the formation of alliances. For a comprehensive survey that considers alliances
with and without intra-alliance conict, see Bloch (2009).
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of an alliance is assumed to be cost neutral here.13 The existence of an alliance is also
neutral to the allocation rule: each player remains a single player and an independent
decision maker, and the winner prize is allocated among individual contestants, as
a function of their individual e¤ort choices. However, as a member of an alliance
the player shares his and the other alliance membersprivate information about their
budget limits (in terms of their individual maximum feasible e¤orts). All players learn
about which alliances exist. And when choosing their e¤orts they take the existence
of information sharing in these other alliances into consideration.
To characterize a Bayesian Nash equilibrium that corresponds to the equilib-
rium in Proposition 1 and to compare the payo¤s of players in the world without,
and with information alliances we dene the interim payo¤ of player i: The interim
payo¤ is the expected payo¤ of this player after learning his own budget limit but
prior to learning the budget limits of other players.
Proposition 2 Let the condition
(n  nk)(F (xi))n nk 1F 0(xi)  1 (4)
hold for all xi 2 (0; b) for all k = 1; :::; r. (i) A Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists with
xi = mi ifmi = maxfms js 2 Ak g and xi = 0 ifmi < maxfms js 2 Ak g for all i 2 Ak,
for all alliances Ak with k = 1; :::; r. (ii) Let i be a player with budget mi. Consider
the two partitions A = fA1; :::; Ah; Ak; ; :::Arg and and A 0 = fA01; :::; Ah[Ak; :::; A0rg.
Let (4) hold for all alliances in both partitions. Let player i 2 Ak in both partitions.
The interim payo¤ of player i is higher (the same) in A 0 than (as) in A if mi > 0
(if mi = 0).
Proof. (i) Suppose that all other players j 6= i follow the strategy described in
the candidate equilibrium. Consider i 2 Ak in the candidate equilibrium. If mi <
maxfms js 2 Ak g, then xi = 0 is superior to any positive xi as it increases is payo¤
by xi, compared to any xi > 0. If, instead, mi = maxfms js 2 Ak g, two cases need
13Suppose joining an alliance causes a xed cost upfront. If player i joins a particular alliance
Ar, this may cause a change in the beliefs of players who are not members of Ar about is budget.
Similarly, if a player does not join an alliance, this may be because his budget is too small to cover
the fee, or because he has a very high budget. In any case, the appropriate equilibrium concept
changes from Bayesian Nash to Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
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to be distinguished. If mi = 0, then player i has no choice, and xi = mi = 0 is
optimal. If mi > 0, then with probability 1 there is no other member of alliance
Ak who has the same budget. Accordingly, in the candidate equilibrium, all other
members of the alliance Ak choose zero e¤orts. Consider the payo¤ of player i from
choosing xi 2 (0;mi). The probability that player i wins with this e¤ort is equal to
the probability that xi is larger than the largest budget in any of the other alliances,
and this is the same probability as the probability that all players who are not a
member of Ak have a lower budget than xi. This probability is equal to (F (xi))n nk .
Accordingly, player is payo¤ is
i(xi) = (F (xi))
n nk   xi. (5)
This payo¤ is (weakly) increasing in the whole range (0; b) if
@i(xi)
@xi
= (n  nk)(F (xi))n nk 1F 0(xi)  1  0 (6)
in this range. Hence, the condition
(n  nk)(F (xi))n nk 1F 0(xi)  1 for all xi 2 (0; b) (7)
is su¢ cient for making xi = mi a choice that maximizes this players payo¤.
(ii) Let the number of members of alliances Ah and Ak be nh  1 and nk  1,
respectively. If mi = 0, then xi = 0 and is interim payo¤ is 1n(F (mi))
n 1 for both
partitions A and A0. If mi > 0, then i wins the prize with a probability (F (mi))n 1
for both partitions A and A0. However, if partition A prevails, then i expends a
positive e¤ort xi = mi if and only if mi = maxfms js 2 Ak g (and xi = 0 otherwise),
and if partition A0 prevails, then i expends a positive e¤ort xi = mi if and only if
mi = maxfms js 2 Ah [ Ak g (and xi = 0 otherwise).14 Accordingly, as for a given
mi the probability that i has the highest budget inside its alliance is decreasing in
the number of members of the alliance, the probability that i expends positive e¤ort
is lower for partition A0. Note also that the win probabilities do not depend on the
particular partition, and the probability for expending positive e¤ort xi = mi depends
only on the size of mi, on F (m) and on the number of players who are inside the same
14Note that all events with maxfms js 2 Ah g = maxfms js 2 Ak g > 0 constitute a set of events
that has zero probability exogenously (and independently of players actions in previous stages),
which is why we do not have to dene equilibrium strategies for this set of events.
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alliance with i, but not on how the players who are not members of this alliance are
partitioned into other alliances.
Proposition 2 characterizes an equilibrium in which the player with the highest
budget from each alliance chooses an e¤ort that is precisely equal to his budget, and
all players from the same alliance who have a lower budget abstain from making any
e¤ort. The equilibrium has a simple intuition. Players inside an alliance Ak share
their information about their respective budgets. After having made this comparison,
typically, unless they all have zero budgets, it becomes clear to nk   1 of them that
there is a player in their group who has a larger budget than the others and that
this player will choose higher e¤ort than they can. They can use the information and
withdraw from competition, i.e., not expend positive e¤ort. All the alliance members
who decide to quit save their e¤orts. From the point of view of non-members, these
withdrawals are irrelevant for their e¤ort choice, as the players who quit are not
the ones with the highest budgets. For the competition only the highest e¤ort from
the players inside the alliance matters; and the distribution of this highest e¤ort is
una¤ected by all the alliance memberslower e¤orts, whether they are zero or positive.
The proposition also shows that the information exchange that takes place in alliances
reduces the total e¤ort, and that the members of the alliance are the only beneciaries
of these savings.
4 Merger incentives and stability
To consider the incentives for contestants for a merger between alliances we need to
describe the timing of the information-sharing in this case. We distinguish between
two cases as regards this timing that are both plausible. In one case (Case 1)
the process of possible mergers is completed before players mutually reveal the size
of their budget among the alliance members. Alternatively, (Case 2) the alliance
members learn about the budgets of the other members of their alliance prior to a
possible further merger with another alliance. If they merge with another alliance,
the members of both alliances also learn the budget constraints of the members of
the merging alliances immediately after the merger, and all intra-alliance information
exchange is completed prior to choosing their own e¤orts in the all-pay auction.
Proposition 3 Let there be a partition of the set N of all n players into r  3
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alliances fA1; :::; Arg with numbers of members n1; :::; nr. Consider a merger of two
of these alliances Ah and Ak with numbers nh and nk of members that leads to a new
alliance Ah&k with nh + nk members. Let condition (7) also hold for nh&k = nh + nk.
The merger (weakly) increases the interim payo¤s of all members of Ah and Ak in
Case 1. In Case 2, consider the expected payo¤s of players ih 2 Ah who know
their own budget and the budgets of the members of Ah. The merger leaves these
payo¤s of all players ih 2 Ah with mih 6= maxfms js 2 Ahg unchanged and increases
(leaves unchanged) the expected payo¤ for ih 2 Ah with mih = maxfms js 2 Ahg if
mih > 0 (if mih = 0)(and analogously for Ak).
Proof. To compare the payo¤s, without loss of generality we consider a player i from
alliance Ah. We need to distinguish between the two cases.
Case 1 holds as a corollary to Proposition 2.
Case 2. Consider a player i 2 Ah who learned his own budget and the budget
of the members of Ah. Ifmi < maxfms js 2 Ahg then is expected payo¤at this point
is zero, irrespective whether a merger occurs or not. If mi = maxfms js 2 Ahg, then
several cases need to be distinguished. If mi = maxfms js 2 Ahg = 0 then xi = 0 and
is probability of winning the prize after learning mi = maxfms js 2 Ahg but prior
to the merger is 1
n
(F (0))n nh and independent of whether the merger takes place. If
mi = maxfms js 2 Ahg > 0 then i wins the prize with probability (F (mi))n nh, with
or without the merger. However, is expected e¤ort is lower if the merger occurs:
without a merger, i expends xi = mi. With the merger, i expends xi = mi if only if
mi = maxfms js 2 Ah&k g and xi = 0 otherwise.
Proposition 3 characterizes the payo¤ implications of a merger of alliances.
The proposition shows that a merger of alliances is benecial for the members of
both alliances (or at least does not harm them), and the merger does not benet
players who are not members of the merging alliances. This result emerges for both
timings of information exchange in the process of mergers of alliances. Intuitively,
if two alliances merge, the information exchange is extended towards the members
of both alliances. For maxfms js 2 Ahg > 0 and maxfms js 2 Ak g > 0, without
the merger the player from each of the two alliances who has the largest budget in
this alliance expends e¤ort equal to his entire budget. Only one of them can win.
If the players know about each others budget limits, one of them will abstain from
expending a positive e¤ort, knowing that he cannot win against the other player. This
14
information exchange occurs due to the merger, and prior to the choices of e¤orts.
The merger reduces the total expected e¤ort of all alliance members. However, it
leaves the highest e¤ort from players in the merged group una¤ected. Given the (also
unchanged) e¤ort choices of players outside the two merging alliances, the merging
alliance as a whole has the same overall win probability, but expends lower e¤ort.
We can now use the results in Proposition 2 to briey discuss the stability of a
partition of the set of all players into information alliances. We continue distinguishing
between Case 1 and Case 2 regarding the timing of information exchange. Recall
that in Case 1 we assume that players inside an alliance do not learn the budget
constraints of the other players in the same alliance until a possibly endogenous
process of mergers comes to a complete halt and no further possible mergers are
allowed. In Case 2 we assume that players learn about the budget constraints of
other members of the same alliance as soon as an alliance is formed, irrespective
whether the merging alliances Ah and Ak are singletons or are alliances with more
than one player. We dene a partition fA1; :::; Akg as a stable partition if it has the
following property:
(S1)Given A  fA1; :::; Akg, there are no two alliances Ah 2 A and Ak 2 A for which
the merger of the two alliances to Ah&k = Ah [ Ak is a (weak) Pareto improvement
for the members of both alliances.
The stability criterion (S1) requires that, at the point at which the merger
may be enacted, all members in an alliance (at least weakly) prefer non-merger to
merger, for all possible mergers. We will consider the situation in which the grand
coalition (A = fN g) is ruled out, and a situation in which the grand coalition is
feasible. We nd the following:
Proposition 4 Suppose a grand coalition (A = fN g) is not feasible. If the condition
(n   nk)(F (xi))n nk 1F 0(xi)  1 holds for all nk < n   1, then the set of stable
partitions is equal to the set of partitions with only two alliances fA1; A2g.
Proof. Consider Case 1. A proof is by contradiction. For any partition fA1; :::; Arg
with r > 2 it follows from Proposition 2 that a merger between two of these alliances
(weakly) increases the interim payo¤s of all members of these two alliances and leaves
the interim payo¤s of non-members of the merging alliances unchanged.
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ConsiderCase 2. All players i in an allianceAh for whichmi < maxfms js 2 Ahg
have a payo¤ equal to zero, irrespective of whether the alliance merges with another
alliance or not. Player i withmi = maxfms js 2 Ahg is indi¤erent as regards a merger
if mi = 0. For mi > 0, having learned his own budget and the budgets of other mem-
bers of Ah, the player i strictly benets in expectation from a merger with another
alliance Ak. After a merger it is revealed to i whether mi = maxfms js 2 Ahg >
maxfms js 2 Ak g or not. The merger does not change is probability of winning, but
makes i save the futile e¤ort mi in case maxfms js 2 Ahg < maxfms js 2 Ak g.
Proposition 4 shows that the process of merger between alliances is Pareto
improving as long as a further merger is possible. Intuitively, alliance members ex-
change information in order to prevent futile e¤ort in an all-pay auction. This is a
strong incentive for a merger, if the merger provides the means for this information
exchange. We have not analyzed the precise path of possibly endogenous mergers, or
the dynamics of possible merger proposals and acceptances. If the game is extended
in this direction, players may choose their proposals / acceptances strategically, and
their choices can be interpreted by others, and thereby may induce a change in play-
ersbeliefs about other playersbudgets. This changes the nature of the game and the
equilibrium concept that needs to be applied becomes Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
Also, individual players do not have an option to switch from one alliance to another
here. The option to leave one alliance and to move to another alliance is a relevant
issue. Individualspreferences would be to be allocated to a large, rather than to a
small alliance.
So far the grand alliance was excluded. Consider now the payo¤ consequences
of the formation of a grand alliance, compared to a partition with two alliances.
Proposition 5 Consider a partition of the type fA1; A2g and a grand alliance N 
A1 [ A2. The transition to the grand alliance is a (weak) Pareto improvement for
players for both Case 1 and Case 2.
Proof. With one grand information alliance that includes all players, several situa-
tions have to be distinguished that lead to di¤erent types of equilibrium. If mi = 0
for all i 2 N , then all players expend zero e¤ort and win with the same probability of
1=n. If mi > 0 for exactly one i 2 A1[A2 and mj = 0 for all other j 6= i, then xj = 0
for all j 6= i. The optimal e¤ort by i is not well dened in this case due to an open-
16
ness problem. But a solution to this is a tie-breaking rule for xi = xj = 0 by which i
(the only player who could expend positive e¤ort) wins with probability 1 even if all
players choose the same e¤ort of zero, yielding an equilibrium with xi = xj = 0 for
all players. Finally, let
mi = maxfms js 2 N g > mj = maxfms js 2 N   figg > 0 (8)
for players i and j. Then the results in Che and Gale (1997) can be used. Their results
imply that an equilibrium exists in which all players other than i and j expend zero
e¤ort and have a payo¤ of zero, the players i and j randomize on the interval [0;mj],
and have expected payo¤s equal to 1 mj for player i and equal to zero for player j
in the equilibrium.15
Consider whether players prefer the transition to the grand alliance to take
place or not. We distinguish again between the two cases of timing as regards infor-
mation exchange.
Case 1: Players know only the size of their own budgets prior to a possible
transition to the grand coalition. A player i 2 A1 with mi = 0 has an interim
payo¤ equal to 1
n
(F (0))n 1 with and without a merger. Consider the interim payo¤
of a player i 2 A1 with mi > 0. If the grand alliance is formed, his payo¤ is zero
if mi < maxfms js 2 N g. For given mi > 0 this happens with a probability of
1   (F (mi))n 1. With the remaining probability (F (mi))n 1 his budget is mi =
maxfms js 2 N g. In this case i earns the payo¤ in the respective all-pay auction, and
this payo¤ becomes 1   maxfms js 2 N   figg > 1   mi. Accordingly, is interim
payo¤ exceeds (F (mi))n 1(1 mi) by the rst inequality in (8). Without formation
of the grand coalition, is interim payo¤ is (F (mi))n 1   (F (mi))n1 1mi, which is
smaller than (F (mi))n 1(1 mi).
Case 2: Players learn their own budgets and the budgets of other members
of their alliance prior to the possible formation of the grand alliance. Without loss of
generality we consider again player i 2 A1. If mi < maxfms js 2 A1g then this player
anticipates at this point that his payo¤ is zero, with or without the formation of the
15The results in Che and Gale (1997) refer to the case in which there are only two players. It is
straightforward to show that an optimal reply to the equilibrium bid distributions for i and j for
players with a budget lower than mj is to bid zero, and the analysis here is based on the assumption
that the grand alliance plays this equilibrium. Other equilibria, in which more than two players
make positive bids, can also exist.
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grand alliance. Let mi = maxfms js 2 A1g. If this mi = 0, then player is expected
payo¤ at this point is 1
n
(F (0))n n1, with or without the merger. If this mi > 0,
then is expected payo¤ at this point is (F (mi))n n1   mi if the grand alliance is
not formed. If the grand alliance is formed, player is payo¤ at the point at which
he knows the budgets of all members of A1, but not those of A2 is (F (mi))n n1(1  
Emi(maxfms js 2 N   figg)); where Emi(maxfms js 2 N   figg) is dened as the
expected value of the second highest budget in N , conditional onmi being the highest
budget. A comparison of these payo¤s shows that player i has a preference for the
formation of the grand alliance.
Proposition 5 establishes that the grand coalition would be a further Pareto
improvement at the interim stage. Intuitively, also the transition from a partition
fA1; A2g to the grand alliance does not change the payo¤s of most of the players who
actually have zero payo¤ in any case, but it yields some savings in futile e¤ort among
the players with high budgets.16 We nd: if the grand alliance is feasible, endogenous
alliance formation does not stop at a partition with two alliances.
5 Conclusions
When competing for a prize, players may often like to expend more e¤ort than they
are able to expend. Also, players may know their own limits, but typically do not
know the budget limits of their competitors. This incomplete information together
with tight budget constraints may lead to a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which each
player simply expends his whole budget. The total sum of e¤ort costs expended
does not exceed the value of the prize in this equilibrium in expectation, but in the
equilibrium many players make futile e¤orts. Players would abstain from expending
e¤ort if they knew that other players are less budget constrained and can simply
outbid them. Therefore, players may be interested in forming groups for the purpose
16The argument is slightly more complex than for alliance mergers in Proposition 4: due to the
di¤erent nature of the contest equilibrium in the grand alliance, the players expending positive e¤ort
after the formation of the grand alliance are not necessarily a subset of the players who expended
positive e¤ort in the contest with two alliances. The formation of the grand alliance mobilizes the
two players with the highest budgets, and these may well be from the same alliance A1 or A2.
However, as this mobilized player with the second-highest budget has zero expected payo¤ also in
the contest with a grand alliance, this does change the result.
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of information exchange among group members. We showed that this type of alliance
formation benets all players who join in such an alliance ex-ante, and does not harm
them ex-post. We also showed that the benets of an information alliance are typically
higher if the alliance has more members, making larger alliances and the merger of
alliances advantageous for members of the existing alliances. Also, such information
alliances do not benet non-members of a respective alliance. These properties can
also be used to explain why the endogenous formation of alliances leads to partitions
with the smallest feasible number of alliances.
In the framework considered, the formation of alliances has only the purpose
of information sharing, whereas alliances typically include more features in addition
to an exchange of information about strength. This makes it di¢ cult to test the
empirical predictions of our analysis directly. However, it is interesting to observe
that the result by which the smallest number of alliances is desirable ts well with
the observed number of alliances in international conicts that involved many nations.
The results in this paper may contribute to explaining why alliances are
formed. Alliances may alleviate information problems among players and give its
members superior information about each other. It may mean that its members
share information that is otherwise private, and remains private vis-a-vis players who
are not members of the alliance. We show that information sharing provides a strong
incentive for the formation of alliances when budget constraints are su¢ ciently tight.
This benecial aspect of alliance formation may outweigh some of the aspects that
establish the alliance formation puzzle and may contribute to the explanation why
alliances are rather common, despite the problems of free-riding and ghting inside
the alliance.
6 Appendix
Let F (m) be a distribution with support [0; b] without holes and without mass points.
Let (n   1)(F (m))n 2F 0(m) < 1 for all m 2 (0; b). We show that (i) e¤orts xi =
minfmi; 1g do not constitute an equilibrium and that (ii) a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
exists in which the e¤orts of players are (ex-ante) distributed according to G(x) as in
(3).
Consider (i). As F (m) has has support [0; b] and has no holes and no mass
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point, this implies that b > 1. Suppose xj = minfmj; 1g for all j 6= i. The payo¤ of i
is i(xi) = (F (xi))
n 1   xi for the interior range xi 2 (0;minfmi; 1g). In this range
it holds that
@i(xi)
@xi
= (n  1)F n 2F 0(xi)  1 < 0. (9)
For any given xi 2 (0;minfmi; 1g), player i can increase the own payo¤ by a decrease
in xi. Consider now (ii). The payo¤ of a player i in the candidate equilibrium with
Gj(xj) = n 1
p
xj for all j 6= i is i(x) = ( n 1pxi)n 1   xi = 0. This makes the player
indi¤erent for all possible xi 2 [0;minfmi; 1g], and makes any randomization on the
feasible interval [0;minfmi; 1g] of feasible e¤ort choices an optimal reply for player
i. It is, therefore, su¢ cient to show that a random distribution of e¤ort choices as
G(x) = n 1
p
x for the whole interval [0; 1] is feasible from an ex-ante point of view,
given thatmi itself is a draw from a random distribution with cumulative distribution
function F (m). For this purpose it is su¢ cient to show thatGj(xj) = n 1
p
xj is feasible
for F (m) with F (0) = 0 and (n  1)(F (m))n 2F 0(m) < 1: The latter follows from the
fact that
(n  1)(G(x))n 2G0(x) = 1 > (n  1)(F (m))n 2F 0(m). (10)
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